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Cooperative Innovation Evolutionary Game Analysis of Industrialized Building Supply Chain

机译:工业建筑供应链合作创新的演化博弈分析

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Great changes have taken place in construction methods of industrial building relative to traditional construction. The cooperation between construction contractors, prefabricated parts suppliers and other materials and equipment suppliers in the supply chain of the industrial building can not be ignored. The evolutionary game theory can be used to explain the dynamic trend of the relationship until it is stable. The evolutionary game theory is applied to study the process and method of cooperative innovation between construction contractor and many subcontractors. Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper discusses the process and method of cooperative innovation between the construction contractors and numerous subcontractors. It focuses on the analysis of the influence of cooperative profit distribution, spillover effect, innovation subsidies and cooperation risk sharing for evolutionary stable strategy. The evolutionary game model of cooperation parties is constructed. The key indexes such as profit, risk loss, distribution of excess income and innovation cost are considered comprehensively. The results show that with the increasing of the spillover effect, innovation cooperation, suppliers' innovation income and excess returns of cooperation innovation, the system will tend to the stability of cooperation. And with the increasing of the contractor's subsidy coefficient, the innovation cost, cooperation innovation risk cost, the system will tend to uncooperative. There exists an optimal distribution coefficient of excess income, which can strengthen the cooperation willingness of both sides. This study provides a guidance for the cooperative innovation of the supply chain participating parties.
机译:与传统建筑相比,工业建筑的建筑方法已发生了巨大变化。在工业建筑的供应链中,建筑承包商,预制零件供应商与其他材料和设备供应商之间的合作不容忽视。进化博弈论可以用来解释这种关系的动态趋势,直到稳定为止。运用进化博弈理论研究建筑承包商与许多分包商之间合作创新的过程和方法。基于演化博弈论,探讨了建筑承包商与众多分包商之间合作创新的过程和方法。重点分析了合作利润分配,溢出效应,创新补贴和合作风险分担对演化稳定策略的影响。建立了合作方的演化博弈模型。综合考虑利润,风险损失,超额收益分配和创新成本等关键指标。结果表明,随着溢出效应,创新合作,供应商的创新收入和合作创新超额收益的增加,系统将趋于稳定。并且随着承包商的补贴系数,创新成本,合作创新风险成本的增加,系统将趋于不合作。存在超额收入的最优分配系数,可以增强双方的合作意愿。该研究为供应链参与方的合作创新提供了指导。

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