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Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

机译:公共物品实验中的第二方和第三方惩罚

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摘要

We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment. The third party's exaggerated emotion towar
机译:我们通过实验研究了第三方惩罚是否比第二方惩罚更有效地增加了公共物品的贡献。在我们的实验中,第三方首先玩标准的公益游戏,然后作为独立的旁观者做出惩罚决定。我们发现,第三方的处罚更加频繁,严厉,反社会的处罚也较少,因此其贡献水平要高于第二方惩罚所推动的贡献水平。第三方夸张的情感战争

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