Impacts of government subsidies on pricing and performance level choice in Energy Performance Contracting: A two-step optimal decision model

摘要

Government subsidies generally play a crucial role in pricing and the choice of performance levels in Energy Performance Contracting (EPC). However, the existing studies pay little attention to how the Energy Service Company (ESCO) prices and chooses performance levels for EPC with government subsidies. To fill 'such a gap, we propose a joint optimal decision model of pricing and performance level in EPC considering government subsidies. The optimization of the model is achieved via a two-stage process. At the first stage, given a performance level, ESCOs choose the best price; and at the second stage, ESCOs choose the optimal performance level for the optimal price. Furthermore, we carry out a numerical analysis to illuminate such an optimal decision mechanism. The results show that both price sensitivity and performance level sensitivity have significant effects on the choice of performance levels with government subsidies. Government subsidies can induce higher performance levels of EPC, the demand for EPC, and the profit of ESCO. We suggest that ESCO's market strategy should firstly focus on high energy consumption industries with government subsidies and that government subsidies standard adopted in different industries should be differentiated according to the market characteristics and energy efficiency levels of various industries. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.