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Rent seeking and taxation in the Ancient Roman Empire

机译:古罗马帝国的寻租和税收

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摘要

Historians maintain that an increase in taxation of the peasant farmers, government corruption and misuse of its revenue by the ruling class led to a weakening of the Roman Empire that culminated in its western demise in the fifth century. But it was not just the taxation issue doomed the Roman Empire, but political change from a Republic to an emperor that exacerbated the climate of rent-seeking behaviour by the ruling classes that culminated in the misallocation of tax resources. One category of rent seeking involves the spending of money that the average taxpayer sees as foolish but that benefits a particular group. The groups who bear the costs can stop the rent seeking if they are informed. These average citizens were peasant farmers who no doubt recognized the costs but were unable to form political coalitions to protect themselves because military control of Roman legions was under the tight control of the emperor. This was not the case under the Republic. With the emperors, public funds were being diverted from the public infrastructure such as road building and repair to more frivolous activities.
机译:历史学家认为,对农民的税收增加,政府腐败以及统治阶级滥用其收入导致了罗马帝国的衰弱,最终导致了罗马帝国在第五世纪的灭亡。但这不仅仅是税收问题注定了罗马帝国,而是从共和国到皇帝的政治变化,加剧了税收资源分配不当的统治阶级,加剧了寻租行为的气氛。寻租的一种类型涉及一般纳税人认为愚蠢的钱花,但对特定群体有利。承担费用的团体如果被告知,可以停止寻租。这些普通市民是农民农民,他们无疑意识到了代价,但由于罗马军团的军事控制在皇帝的严格控制下,因此无法组建政治联盟来保护自己。在共和国统治下情况并非如此。在皇帝的陪同下,公共资金从公共基础设施(如修路和修repair)转移到了其他琐碎的活动上。

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