Economic and conservation implications of a variable effort penalty system in effort-controlled fisheries

摘要

Bycatch of threatened, endangered or protected species by commercial fishers is a universal problem. Technical solutions are often applied that may impose inefficiencies across the fleet, even in periods or areas when the risk of bycatch is low. These may include gear specifically designed to avoid the bycatch which may also reduce the targeted catch, or designation of marine protected areas that exclude fishing from whole areas. In this article, we examine the effectiveness of a variable penalty system that can provide incentives for fishers to redirect their effort away from problem areas. The system is examined using a case study of fishery, which is currently subjected to gear and closure controls to limit bycatch of turtles and seabirds. An alternative incentive-based management policy using a series of differential hook penalties has been proposed as a flexible tool to discourage vessels operating in certain areas. The effects of various hook penalties and closures in key areas on fishing effort in those areas and elsewhere as well as vessel economic performance are assessed using a location choice model. The results suggest that incentive-based approaches may result in lower costs to industry than closures provided some level of residual bycatch is acceptable.