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Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

机译:重新审视政治机构和中央银行的独立性

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We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2010.485923
机译:我们将有关中央银行独立性(CBI)的早期研究与政治,制度和经济变量联系起来。数据表明,CBI与联邦制的存在,选举制度和政党的特征,样本所包括的国家对经济活动水平的冲击之间的相关性正相关,对于一个经济子样本也与之相关。 ,是加入欧洲货币联盟(EMU)的收敛标准。 ,digg,google,more“,发布号:” ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b“};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2010.485923

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