Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment

摘要

A major puzzle in the literature on social preferences is that a large majority of subjects behaves as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such as in competitive experimental markets with standardized goods or in the final rounds of public goods experiments; while in other circumstances a large majority behaves as if strongly motivated by fairness concerns, e.g., in competitive markets with incomplete contracts or in public goods experiments with punishment opportunities. Recently developed models of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels, 2000) can explain this puzzle by assuming a heterogeneous population of selfish and inequity-averse subjects. Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel (2004, henceforth E&S) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments, claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion.