If negotiators can write binding contracts, why is there ever costly disagreement in bilateral bargaining? Existing formal theory emphasizes two main possibilities. Disagreement arises because of incomplete information or because of irrational negotiators. Thomas C. Schelling (1956, 1960, 1966) proposes a third reason.1 Rational negotiators may attempt to increase their share of the available surplus by visibly committing themselves to an aggressive bargaining stance and thereby forcing concessions from an uncommitted opponent. If both negotiators simultaneously make such strategic commitments, there is conflict.
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机译：如果谈判者可以签订具有约束力的合同，那么为什么在双边谈判中存在代价高昂的分歧？现有的形式理论强调两种主要可能性。由于信息不完整或谈判人员不合理而引起分歧。托马斯·谢林（Thomas C. Schelling，1956年，1960年，1966年）提出了第三个理由。1理性的谈判者可以通过明显地承诺采取积极的讨价还价的立场，从而迫使未作承诺的对手做出让步，从而试图增加他们在可用盈余中的份额。如果两个谈判者同时做出这样的战略承诺，那就存在冲突。
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