Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight

摘要

We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deter ministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains' structures are assumed to be set "once and for all" in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible. This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain's future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a "game against nature". This problem is modeled by linear binary programs.