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The ‘Alternative Quality Contract’ in Massachusetts Based on Global Budgets Lowered Medical Spending and Improved Quality

机译:在另类质量合同在马萨诸塞州基于全球预算低位医疗支出及提高质量

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摘要

Seven provider organizations in Massachusetts entered the Blue Cross Blue Shield Alternative Quality Contract in 2009, followed by four more organizations in 2010. This contract, based on a global budget and pay-for-performance for achieving certain quality benchmarks, places providers at risk for excessive spending and rewards them for quality, similar to the new Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations in Medicare. We analyzed changes in spending and quality associated with the Alternative Quality Contract and found that the rate of increase in spending slowed compared to control groups. Overall, participation in the contract over two years led to a savings of 3.3% (1.9% in year-1, 3.3% in year-2) compared to spending in groups not participating in the contract. The savings were even higher for groups whose previous experience had been only in fee-for-service contracting. Such groups’ quarterly savings over two years averaged 8.2% (6.3% in year-1, 9.9% in year-2). Quality of care also improved within organizations participating in the Alternative Quality Contract compared to control organizations in both years. Chronic care management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care improved from year 1 to year 2 within the contracting groups. These results suggest that global budgets coupled with pay-for-performance can begin to slow the underlying growth in medical spending while improving quality.
机译:马萨诸塞州的七个提供商组织于2009年签署了《蓝十字蓝盾替代质量合同》,随后在2010年又签署了四个组织。该合同基于全球预算和为实现某些质量基准而按绩效付费的合同,这使提供商面临风险过多的支出并奖励其质量,类似于Medicare中新成立的Pioneer Accountable Care Organisation。我们分析了与替代质量合同相关的支出和质量的变化,发现与对照组相比,支出的增长速度减慢了。总体而言,与不参加合同的团体相比,两年内参加合同可节省3.3%(第一年为1.9%,第二年为3.3%)。对于以前只有服务付费合同经验的团队,节省的费用更高。这些群体在两年内的季度储蓄平均为8.2%(第一年为6.3%,第二年为9.9%)。与两年内的对照组织相比,参与替代质量合同的组织内的护理质量也有所提高。从签约组的第一年到第二年,慢性护理管理,成人预防护理和儿科护理得到改善。这些结果表明,全球预算与按绩效付费相结合可以开始放慢医疗支出的潜在增长,同时提高质量。

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