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An inclusive fitness analysis of synergistic interactions in structured populations

机译:结构性人群协同相互作用的包容性适应性分析

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摘要

We study the evolution of a pair of competing behavioural alleles in a structured population when there are non-additive or ‘synergistic’ fitness effects. Under a form of weak selection and with a simple symmetry condition between a pair of competing alleles, Tarnita et al. provide a surprisingly simple condition for one allele to dominate the other. Their condition can be obtained from an analysis of a corresponding simpler model in which fitness effects are additive. Their result uses an average measure of selective advantage where the average is taken over the long-term—that is, over all possible allele frequencies—and this precludes consideration of any frequency dependence the allelic fitness might exhibit. However, in a considerable body of work with non-additive fitness effects—for example, hawk–dove and prisoner's dilemma games—frequency dependence plays an essential role in the establishment of conditions for a stable allele-frequency equilibrium. Here, we present a frequency-dependent generalization of their result that provides an expression for allelic fitness at any given allele frequency p. We use an inclusive fitness approach and provide two examples for an infinite structured population. We illustrate our results with an analysis of the hawk–dove game.
机译:当存在非累加或“协同”适应性效应时,我们研究结构化群体中一对竞争行为等位基因的进化。在弱选择的形式下,在一对竞争等位基因之间具有简单对称性的条件下,Tarnita等人。为一个等位基因控制另一个提供了令人惊讶的简单条件。他们的状况可以通过对相应的更简单模型的分析来获得,在该模型中,适应性效应是相加的。他们的结果使用选择性优势的平均值来衡量,该平均值是长期(即所有可能的等位基因频率)的平均值,而这排除了等位基因适应度可能表现出的任何频率依赖性。但是,在具有非加性健身效果的大量工作中(例如,鹰鸽与囚徒困境游戏),频率依赖性在建立稳定的等位基因-频率平衡的条件中起着至关重要的作用。在这里,我们介绍了其结果的频率依赖性概括,该结果为在任何给定等位基因频率p处的等位基因适应度提供了一种表达。我们使用包容性适应方法,并为无限的结构化人口提供了两个示例。我们通过对鹰鸽子博弈的分析来说明我们的结果。

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