旅游定价是经济研究的一个核心议题,文章提出了传统公共景区自然垄断与在线旅行平台双边垄断共存这一新现象,然后从传统的单一经济问题研究拓展到旅游业内不同类别市场的关联性研究,并通过建立多主体关系下的旅游产业链价格协调模型来剖析其在不同协调方式下的经济关系与影响程度,从而优化旅游产业链价格治理关系与政策规制政策.文章最后提出了实行公共景区分类下的门票价格管制、促进在线旅行双边平台协调制度可持续化等建议.研究主要创新之处在于提出了旅游业的双重垄断现象以及旅游产业链的纵向价格协调模型.%It is a common knowledge that public scenic spots in China have the natural advantage of receiving monopoly income. On the other hand, facilitated by the increasing internet speed, smartphone applications, the monopoly power of online travel platforms such as CTRIP and other OTA in the two-sided market is constantly growing. Under the condition that tourism has become a strategic pillar industry in China, tourism pricing has become an important topic in economic research. This paper studies a new phenomenon that natural monopoly of the public scenic spots and two-sided monopoly of online travel platform co-exists and explores the relationships among heterogeneous markets in tourism sector. The industrial chain system includes multiple players such as public tourist attractions, tourists, online travel platform operators, lodging managers and the local governments. The paper compares these stakeholders’ benefits under different scenarios to analyze price coordination mechanism. This paper describes the structure of tourism industry chain and develops the related hypotheses. Furthermore, the paper constructs a specific chain price coordination model for tourism industry which allows us to compare the economic relations and interactions between different price coordination channels. In addition, the paper distinguishes different categories of price coordination according to theory of two-stage cooperation and non-cooperation game under double monopoly of public scenic attractions and online travel platform. Then, the paper proposes six price coordination methods and sets parameters according to the vertical competition reality in the Chinese tourism industry. In order to explain and predict the pricing mechanism under dual monopoly, the paper further calculates and compares the price structure, the profit margins of public scenic spots, revenues of hotels, industry chain profits and social welfare in different situations. Finally, the paper develops a method of balancing the benefits of different stakeholders in the tourism industry in the background that the government regulation and the monopoly power closely intertwine. The study concludes that online travel platform coordination can significantly enhance overall social welfare as well as the traveler surplus, and those benefits are bigger when government impose regulation on entrance admission pricing of the public scenic attractions. In addition, the overall social welfare will decrease with the increase of natural monopoly and administrative monopoly. The total profit of the industrial chain and lodging profits decrease with the increase of government monopoly power. Finally the paper puts forward implementing the regulation of ticket pricing based on the classification of the public scenic spots, promoting the sustainable development of the two- sided platform coordination system for OTAs, and further weakening the administrative monopoly power to release the market power. The main contribution of the study is development of the vertical price coordination model for tourism industry with regard to the dual monopoly phenomenon.
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