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基于博弈论的有无中介参与的信息传播研究

         

摘要

In the context of the Internet, the direct costs of information dissemination became cheaper. However, the information quality is difficult to control and judge because of the information asymmetry, and it finally lead to less effective information dissemination processes. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether participation of an information intermediary can improve these problems. Two game models are constructed in this paper, one of the models is disseminating the information without intermediary, and the other one is disseminating the information with the participation of intermediary during the process. By analyzing the results of this two models, this study discussed the influence factors of all players and the role of intermediary. Finally, we draw conclusions that the participation of an intermediary and its degree of responsibility were the important to information dissemination. In addition, the results also indicated that the reputation mechanism, information communication channels and information literacy are also important factors.%在互联网背景下,信息直接交易成本变小,但信息不对称带来的信息质量难以控制和判断等问题使得传播过程并不高效,本文旨在分析中介的参与是否能提高信息传播的效率。本文构建了信息传播有无中介参与两种情况下的博弈模型,通过对博弈模型的分析,探讨影响信息传播各方策略的因素以及中介的作用。最终得出结论:中介的参与和中介的负责程度均对信息传播过程产生影响。另外,信誉机制、信息传播渠道和信息人的信息素养也是影响信息传播效率的主要因素。

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