管理者早年大饥荒经历与公司财务政策

摘要

为解决管理者特质与其经历的内生性问题，本文借鉴自然实验的思想，以我国1959－1961年发生的大饥荒为外生随机事件，研究其管理者早期大饥荒经历对公司财务行为的影响。我们发现在童年或青少年时期经历过大饥荒的管理者，会选择更为保守的债务政策，并显著降低了公司的负债水平，在债务期限结构上偏好于更灵活的短期债务而避免长期负债，并且这种现象更容易发生在约束机制较弱的企业和国有控股企业。%On the basis of natural experiment to solve the problem of endogeneity of manager's specialty and experience, we taking the great China famine which occurred in 1959 -1961 as exogenous random events, study its effect on the relationship between managers'behavior and the corporate financial policy.We find that managers who experienced the great famine in childhood or adolescence will choose the more conservative debt policy, significantly reduced the companies'debt level, and prefer the more flexible short-term debts on the debt maturity.In addition, the phenomena we found are more likely to occur in the weak constraint-mechanism corporates and state -owned corporates.