科研项目评审与授项中委托代理问题分析

摘要

以科研项目评审与授项为研究对象，揭示了委托代理关系下的不确定性决策过程，通过改进传统委托代理情形下的不确定性决策模型，分析了委托人与代理人的方案选择过程。研究表明，在信息不对称和奖惩系数不合理的情况下，代理人和委托人的决策可能导致项目评审的不公平性，使得科研项目资金资助效率降低。最后，从信息集和奖惩机制方面提出了解决这一问题的对策。%As the study object of the research project evaluation and award item, this paper reveals the uncertain decision process under the entrusting and agency relationship. This paper analyzes the scheme selecting procedure of the client and agent through im-prove the traditional uncertain decision model. Research shows that under the circumstance of information unmatched and rewards and punishment coefficient unreasonable, the decisions of client and agent can lead to the unfair of project evaluation, so the sup-porting efficiency of research project funds will decrease. In the end, the paper puts forward the countermeasures dealing with this problem.