Assuming project‐based organizations cooperate equally ,this paper used principal‐agent theory and game theory , to empower the general contractor to give reward and punishment to the professional sub‐contractor based on a monitoring signal and constructed a model of inter‐organizational cooperative innovation of project‐based supply based on a monitoring signal .Based on the model ,by data simulation and example analysis ,as well as comparison with a traditional model ,we came to the conclusion that the general contractor ,through monitoring signals ,is able to collect more information on the professional sub‐contractor's behavior choice .Thus by adjusting the reward and punishment level ,it can not only lower the professional sub‐contractor's non‐cooperative behavior level ,but can also raise the cooperative behavior level ,all of w hich will reduce the professional sub‐contractor's opportunism and the blindness the general contractor may be alleviated in the design motivation mechanism .%在假定项目型组织平等合作的基础上，运用委托－代理理论和博弈论，纳入总承包商给予专业分包商基于监控信号的奖惩结构，构建了基于监控信号的项目导向型供应链跨组织合作激励模型，并与传统激励模型进行比较，通过数据模拟与模型算例，研究了监控信号对激励契约设计的影响。研究表明：通过引入监控信号，总承包商可以收集到更多有关专业分包商行为选择的信息，通过调整对专业分包商的奖励和惩罚力度，可以促进专业分包商采取合作行为，降低其机会主义行为，也可以降低总承包商对专业分包商激励的盲目性。
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