EPR制度下串谋行为管制的三方演化博弈分析

摘要

Collusive behavioroccurs between producers and auditors during the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system,results in“free-rider” problem and loss of national benefits.Through buildingtripartite evolutionary game model involving producers, auditorsand government authorities,tripartite gamebalance influence factors andcountermeasuresto prevent collusive behavior between producers and auditors are discussed.%生产企业在实施延伸生产者责任制（EPR）中，有可能与审查人伙同串谋，产生“搭便车”问题，导致国家利益受损。通过构建生产企业、审查人和政府主管部门的三方演化博弈模型，分析影响三方博弈均衡的重要因素，探讨生产企业与审查人串谋行为的产生条件，提出有针对性的解决对策。