首页> 中文期刊> 《科技管理研究 》 >低碳经济发展中政府与企业之间的博弈分析

低碳经济发展中政府与企业之间的博弈分析

             

摘要

In order to ensure the sustainable economic development, low - carbon economy becomes an efficient economic development model in China. The development of low - carbon economy needs not only the construction of the governments leading policy, but also the efforts related to the enterprises. The paper discusses the interaction between the government and enterprises by using static game theory and evolutionary game theory. The results of the static game theory a-nalysis show that both the government' s policies like carbon tax, low - carbon subsidies and the fines of the traditional enterprises and the development of enterprises' technology can effectively promote the low — carbon production of the enterprises. While the results of the evolutionary game analysis show that the limited rational enterprises will gradually tend to low - carbon production under a reasonable system.%低碳经济的建设既需要政府的政策引导,也离不开企业的积极参与.在考虑政府和企业间目标差异的情况下,运用静态博弈和演化博弈,考察了在低碳经济建设过程中,政府和企业之间的互动机制.静态博弈模型结果表明,政府碳税、低碳补贴、非低碳生产罚款等一系列政策的改变,或者企业自身内部技术条件和外部支持条件的改变,都可有效促使企业进行低碳生产;演化博弈模型结果表明,在合理的制度系统下,有限理性假设条件下的企业将逐步趋向于低碳生产,进而促使经济发展模式向低碳转变.

著录项

相似文献

  • 中文文献
  • 外文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号