考虑投资成本分摊的OEM和CM外包博弈分析

摘要

分析了由一个原始设备制造商(OEM)与一个合约制造商(CM)构成的供应链系统,建立了引入投资成本分摊的外包博弈模型,讨论了集中决策和分散决策两种情况下OEM和CM的最优外包策略.在分散决策情况下建立了三阶段博弈模型,研究表明OEM的利润与投资成本分摊比例负相关,CM的利润为分摊比例的严格凹函数,并且存在最优分摊比例使得OEM和CM的总利润最大化.在供应链的实际运作中,OEM和CM可以通过协商分摊比例以协调双方各自利润,实现供应链总利润的最大化.通过分析得出分散决策时OEM和CM的总利润小于集中决策时的总利润,进一步论证了博弈的合作均衡相对于非合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势.%This paper focuses on the outsourcing strategy in a supply chain with one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one contract manufacturer (CM). A game model is proposed based on investment cost allocao tion when OEM transferred new technology to the CM for increasing the products' value. Through the development of analytical models that maximize the profits, the optimal outsourcing decisions for OEM and CM are explored under both centralized decision and decentralized decision scenarios. It is also proved that centralized decision has more Pareto advantages than decentralized decision.