企业向消费者发送食品溯源信息的博弈分析

摘要

This paper constructs a signaling dynamic game model of information delivery from enterprises to consumers to explore the refining Byes Nash equilibrium. The results show that “good” enterprise need to send enough food traceability information to get themselves separated from “bad” enterprises, while enterprises which were “not that good” had to send much more information to a-chieve that. And based on the analytical framework, it is found that consumers' improved food security awareness would enhance the signaling of information delivery and be helpful to turn a “lemon market” into a “good” one.%构建了企业向消费者发送食品溯源信息的动态博弈模型，并对该模型的精炼贝叶斯Nash均衡进行求解。研究发现，“优质”企业向消费者发送足够的食品溯源信息便能实现其与“劣质”企业的分离均衡，“次优”企业则需要发送过量信息才能够取信于消费者，实现分离均衡，而增强消费者的食品安全意识，有利于发挥溯源信息发送的信号作用，实现“柠檬市场”向“优质市场”的转变。