双向资金占用下终极控制人与资本结构

摘要

终极控制人对资本结构的影响一直受到广泛关注，当终极控制人采取不同侵占方式时，对资本结构会产生不同的影响。本文锁定资金占用这种侵占方式，在行为层面研究终极控制人对资本结构影响的作用机理。本文以沪深两市2010—2012三年共3011家上市公司作为样本进行实证研究，结果发现终极控制人的资金占用行为的确会引起资本结构的变化。在双向资金占用这一侵占路径上，终极控制人的两权分离度与资本结构呈正相关，现金流权与资本结构呈负相关。非国有终极控制人比国有终极控制人更具有侵占动机，控制的上市公司资产负债率更高。%The effects of ultimate controlling shareholder to the capital structure have attracted widespread attention. This article investigates the effects of different strategies,and how the specific relationship between the two levels will be more conducive to the mechanism of the ultimate controlling shareholder to the capital structure.The empirical analysis is based on 3011 samples selected from 2010 to 2012 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen.It is found that embezzlement of funds do cause changes in the capital structure.There is a positive correlation between the ultimate separation of ownership and capital structure,and a negative correlation between the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder and capital structure.Furthermore,in regards to the embezzlement of funds,the ultimate controlling shareholders of the non-state-owned corporations have more motivation to embezzle,with more debt financing to meet their own needs for encroachment and self-interest.