首页> 中文期刊> 《运筹与管理》 >制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告模型研究

制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告模型研究

         

摘要

This paper addresses the cooperative advertising problem between one manufacturer and multi-retailers with different channel authorities. Under the uncertain demand situation, cooperative advertising models under both the decentralized system and the centralized system are made. We get optimal cooperative advertising strategy with different systems of the manufacturer and the dominant retailer, obtaining optimal ordering strategy of the dominant retailer and fringe retailers and their optimal expectation profit. By analyzing and comparing with the e-quilibrium outcomes of different systems, we prove that the decentralized system is uncoordinated, The study designs the united contract for realizing and conducting channel coordination, and points out that the united contract is not unique under the decentralized system. Contract parameter is positively correlated with each other, and advertising allowance rate, wholesale price and buy-back price are the balance focus of power between manufacturers and dominant retailers.%研究制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告问题.在需求不确定的情况下,建立了制造商和零售商的分散式与集中式系统下的合作广告模型,得到了不同系统下制造商和强势零售商的最优合作广告策略、强势零售商和边缘零售商的最优订货策略,及他们的最优期望利润.通过对不同系统下均衡结果的比较分析,证明了分散式系统存在不协调.设计了实现渠道协调的联合契约,指出分散式协调系统下的联合契约不唯一,契约参数两两正相关,广告补贴率、产品批发价格和回购价格是制造商和强势零售商力量平衡的焦点.

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