政府引导下的逆向供应链契约设计

摘要

运用委托代理理论和甄别博弈的显示性原理,探讨不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计问题.分别基于政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府对零售商实施奖励、政府对零售商实施奖惩三种前提,建立决策模型,得到不同模型下制造商提供给零售商的契约设计策略.三种契约比较分析显示:政府对零售商实施奖励政策时,制造商提供给零售商的线性支付最小,此时制造商提供的契约最为有利.%Using the display principle of agent theory and the screening game theory, we discuss the contract design problem of the reverse supply chain under asymmetric information. We build a decision-making model and obtain the manufacturer's contract design strategies which provide for the retailers in the three different models; the government does not participate in the reverse supply chain, the government implements award policy to retailers and the government implements incentive-punished policies to retailers. The comparative analysis of the three kinds of the contract shows that when the government implements award policy to the retailers, the manufacturer can pay less. At this moment the contract which the manufacturer provides is the most favorable.