基于合作博弈的买方抗衡势力市场绩效与卖方工艺创新强度分析

摘要

We consider a vertical relationship model which consists of an upstream firm and two downstream firms, and construct calculation models of upstream firm’ s process innovation intensity in three different situa-tions-vertical integration, vertical separation in which neither downstream has countervailing power, vertical separation in which only one downstream has countervailing power.By doing these, we analyse the changes of wholesale prices, retail prices, profits and social welfare in equilibrium and get corresponding conclusions, and we also show that“Galbraith hypothesis” has not been verified in the structure of this paper.%设计了由一个上游企业和两个下游企业所构成的产业链纵向关系模型，建立了纵向一体化、纵向分离且下游企业均无买方抗衡势力、以及单个下游企业具有买方抗衡势力三种情况下上游企业的工艺创新强度计算模型，分析了下游企业存在买方抗衡势力时市场中均衡的批发价格、零售价格、企业利润以及社会福利的变化，给出了相应的结论，同时也说明了“加尔布雷斯假说”在本文的结构下没有得到验证。