基于行为地理的跨界水资源冲突研究

摘要

According to the different characteristics caused by geographical location differences of the left and right(LR) banks along a river and upstream and downstream (UD) of the river,the evolutionary game mathematical model of the trans-boundary water resource conflict of the LR banks and the UD of river were established to study the generation mechanism of trans-boundary water resource conflict on the basis of behavioral geography theory. The study shows that the water resource conflict of LR banks and that of UD have different water resource conflict evolutionary laws,so different management strategies should be adopted for the two kinds of water resource conflicts. LR bank evolutionary game has two evolutionary stable strategies(conflict, conflict and negotiation,negotiation). In LR bank evolutionary game,it is the relative benefits of both sides but not the absolute benefits of the individuals to decide the evolutionary direction of the game. In UD evolutionary game,“conflict,conflict”is un-stable strategy and“conflict,negotiation”is the unique evolutionary stable strategy. Increasing negotiation costs and decreasing conflict costs will lead to a proportion growth of the individuals adopting conflict action.%基于行为地理学理论，根据跨界水资源冲突中左右岸和上下游的冲突由于冲突主体地理位置差异而呈现不同特点，建立了左右岸和上下游跨界水资源冲突演化博弈数理模型，研究跨界水资源冲突事件产生机理。理论研究和数值分析表明：上下游水资源冲突与左右岸水资源冲突具有不同的发展演化规律，需要在水资源冲突管理的实践中对上下游水资源冲突和左右岸水资源冲突采取不同的管理策略；左右岸演化博弈有（冲突，冲突）和（协商，协商）两个演化稳定策略，博弈双方个体的相对收益而不是个体在博弈中的收益对博弈演化的方向有重要的影响。在上下游演化博弈中，（冲突，冲突）是不稳定策略，其演化稳定策略为（冲突，协商），增加协商成本和减小冲突成本均导致上下游群体中采取冲突策略的个体比例上升。