双渠道竞争中的需求信号分享策略研究

摘要

This paper applies the game theory with incomplete information to explore the value of the signal data about demand and the information sharing issue in competitive dual channels.The research shows that the manufacturer's appropriate pricing for the signal data can induce the retailers to purchase such data and help the retailers to choose more reasonable retailing prices.Compared with the case without information sharing of signal,the manufacturer and the retailers can earn more profits from such information sharing,and the expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailers resulting from the information all increase in the accuracy of the signal.The increase of the competing intensity between the retailers will benefit the manfuacturer,and hurt the retailers themselves.%利用不完全信息静态博弈研究了竞争双渠道中需求的信号数据价值和信息分享问题.结果表明,制造商通过对信号数据合理的定价,可以引导零售商选择购买信号数据,从而帮助零售商更加恰当地选取零售价.相比于无信号数据分享的情形,制造商与零售商都可以获得更多的信息利润,并且这些信息利润都随信号准确度的增加而增加.零售商之间竞争强度的增加会惠及制造商,却不利于零售商自身.