In this paper we first formulated the remuneration and incentive mechanism model for the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and self-operated stores with symmetric and non-symmetric information respectively, then analyzed the remuneration and incentive mechanism when there are self-operated stores in the supply chain as well as its information value, and finally compared the model before and after the introduction of the stores. We found that either with symmetric or non—symmetric information, the effort level of the retailer in a retail store would not exceed that of the manufacturer in the self-operated store; the manufacturer, by introducing the self-operated store, could earn extra expected benefit which is greater with bigger output coefficient and lower effort cost.%针对存在自营店的供应链薪酬激励机制设计问题,首先在对称信息和非对称信息下建立了由制造商、零售商及自营店组成的供应链薪酬激励机制模型,然后分析存在自营店的薪酬激励机制设计结果及其信息价值,最后对自营店引入前后的模型结果进行比较.研究表明,在对称信息和非对称信息下,零售商在零售店中的努力水平始终不超过制造商在自营店中的努力水 平；制造商通过引入自营店可以获得额外的期望收益,并且产出系数越大、努力成本越低,制造商所获得的额外期望收益越多.
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