不同风险偏好的供应链返利与惩罚契约研究

摘要

In this paper, we studied the rebate and penalty contract coordination model of a two-echelon supply chain composed by a risk-favoring retailer and a risk-neutral supplier. First we analyzed separately the contract coordination of the supply chain where the retailer was neutral to risk, built the retailer integrated objective decision function, discussed the optimal ordering decisions of the retailer with varied risk preference attitudes and presented the conditions for the rebate and penalty contract to work. At last, through a numerical analysis, we demonstrated the effectiveness of the contract designed in this paper and found that it could coordinate supply chains with different risk preferences and wha/s different than with risk neutrality was that under risk preference, the profit of the supply chain members would be both affected by parameters of both the risk and the contract.%研究了由具有风险偏好的零售商和风险中性的供应商组成的两级供应链返利与惩罚契约协调模型.单独分析了零售商风险中性情况下的契约协调情况,建立了基于两风险参数{α,λ}刻画风险偏好程度的零售商集成目标决策函数,讨论了不同风险偏好态度下的零售商最优订货决策变化情况,给出了返利与惩罚契约能够协调的条件.最后通过数值分析验证了设计的供应链返利与惩罚契约的有效性.结果表明,返利与惩罚契约能够对不同风险偏好的供应链实现协调.与风险中性情况不同之处在于,风险偏好下的供应链成员利润将受风险参数和契约参数的双重影响.