Instead of rejecting the notion of iconicity,as has often been the case in semiotics,we should inquire deeper into its specific nature,and also into the peculiar way in which it is manifested by pictures.In order to show why Umberto Eco,Nelson Goodman,and others were fundamentally wrong in their classical critique of iconicity,we will pursue a close reading of Peirce,but we will interpret his work in accordance with more recent findings in cognitive and perceptual psychology,and we will modify the theory as a result of our interpretation.At the same time,we will rely on phenomenological insights,both those made explicit by Edmund Husserl in his studies of pictorial consciousness,and those which are implicit,notably in the work of the psychologist James Gibson.As a result,we will distinguish iconicity as such from iconic grounds and iconic signs,and we will delineate two very different kinds of iconic signs,which we will call primary and secondary iconic signs.Even so,pictorial iconicity has its peculiarities,which we will also try to elucidate.In so doing,we will consider to what extent the linguistic model is still helpful,and in which respects it is misleading.
展开▼
