博弈视角下零售商主导的二级供应链利益协调机制研究

摘要

The paper,taking game theory as the basic analytical tool,builds the model of benefit distribution to study the coordination of benefits in the secondary supply chain led by retailers.It finds whether manufacturers and retailers could cooperate with each other will have a great impact on the efficiency of the secondary supply chain led by retailers.It gives the necessary conditions for cooperation between manufacturers and retailers by dynamic repeated game model.Studies show that retailers lead the entire supply chain by virtue of channel advantages.If retailers and manufacturers share the proceeds,the efficiency of the entire supply chain will be optimized.However,while retailers'and manufacturers'ben-efits are integrated in the entire supply chain,the distribution of benefits puts retailers and manufacturers in a Prisoners'Dilemma.Therefore,the paper gives the solutions by mechanism design in terms of the benefits of supply chain.%以博弈理论作为研究的基本分析工具,构造利益分配模型,研究零售商主导的二级供应链利益协调问题.分别对零售商主导的二级供应链中制造商和零售商在销售渠道的合作与否时供应链效率的影响进行了分析,并且通过动态重复博弈模型给出了制造商与零售商合作的必要条件.研究表明,零售商凭借渠道上的优势主导着整个供应链.如果零售商能够与制造商共同分享收益,那么可以使整个供应链的长期效益得到优化.但是,当零售商与制造商的利益纳入整个供应链时,利益的分配又一次使零售商与制造商陷入了"囚徒困境"之中.从供应链整体利益出发,通过机制设计给出了解决办法.