首页> 中文期刊> 《技术经济与管理研究》 >基于双向期权契约的零部件供应链协调

基于双向期权契约的零部件供应链协调

         

摘要

When raw materials have a variety of uses and upgrade fast, processing them into finished components ahead of time or keeping a lot of inventory will bring a more expensive opportunity cost. Therefore, the upstream supplier hopes that the downstream manufacturer will share the risk of stocking materials ahead, that means the manufacturer determines the conventional orders and purchase a quantity of bidirectional options; before the beginning of the downstream production process, the manufacturer can acquire more adequate demand information and decide the quality and quantity of options to exercise;if it is necessary to exercise call options to get supplements, the upstream supplier would have to setup the JIT mode to satisfy the demand. Model solutions and numerical examples demonstrate that bidirectional options can coordinate the supply chain and improve the profits of the whole supply chain and its two members;what's more, the wholesale price for conventional orders and the exercise price of put options decrease with the increase of raw materials' opportunity cost, so does the profit increment of the upstream supplier, however, the downstream manufacturer's profit increment changes with an opposite trend.%原材料具有多种用途且更新换代较快,若将其提前加工为零部件或者持有大量库存,必然会产生较为昂贵的机会成本,因此,上游供货商往往要求下游生产商与其共担原材料备货风险:下游生产商确定零部件常规订货量的同时,购买一部分具有双向属性的期权;下游生产商组织加工产成品前夕获得更为准确的需求数据后,确定期权的执行性质及数量;若需要执行看涨期权补货,供应商启动准时制供应模式对其供货。模型求解及算例分析表明:双向属性的期权价格机制能够实现零部件供应链整体利润的最大化,也能够使上下游成员均获得利润改进;随着原材料备货机会成本的上升,常规订货量批发价和看跌期权执行价格都呈现下降趋势,上游供应商利润增量不断减少,而下游加工商利润增量却不断上升。

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