沙轮式产业集群治理措施研究--基于非对称演化博弈的视角

摘要

The systematic analysis on the problems of the governance measurement of the sand-wheel liked industrial cluster is pr-ovided based on the perspective of the non-symmetric evolutionary game. Through the summary of domestic and foreign research status , there are several outcomes. There are different characteristics and game behavior for industrial clusters in different developing status. On the basis of previous studies, the concept and characteristics of sand-wheel liked industry cluster are defined and described, and the evolutionary game behavior of government and enterprises are analyzed through the construction of replication dynamic equation model. The results show that there are four evolutionary stable equilibriums and two unstable equilibrium points between government and enter-prise, but only the Encouragement and Contact as one of evolutionary stable equilibriums is conducive for clusters and regional economic coordinated development. Finally, the idea of "reducing the probability of falling on the adverse area and enhancing the probability of falling on the favorable area"becomes the ideology guide to present the specific governance measures.%文章基于非对称演化博弈模型，对沙轮式产业集群治理问题进行了系统的分析。通过对国内外研究现状的总结发现：产业集群不同发展阶段，其特点、博弈行为等存在差异性。在前人研究基础上，文章对“沙轮式产业集群”概念与特征进行了界定与描述，并通过构建复制动态方程的方法来分析该阶段政府与企业间的演化博弈行为。研究结果表明：政府与企业间存在四种演化稳定均衡状态和两种不稳定均衡点，其中只有（鼓励，联系）一种演化稳定均衡状态有利于集群与区域经济协调发展。最后，文章以降低落在不利区域概率，提升落在有利区域概率为指导思想，提出了该类型产业集群具体的治理措施。