以国企高管更换对业绩的敏感性为切入点, 考察非控股股东派驻董事的治理效应.研究发现, 非控股股东派驻董事显著增强国企高管更换对业绩的敏感性, 且派驻比例越高, 敏感性越强;相反, 非控股股东持股比例并不影响国企高管更换对业绩的敏感性.这些结果表明, 相比于简单构建多股同大的股权制衡结构, 提高非控股股东在国企董事会的代表性可能是更为有效的制度安排, 从而为当前发展混合所有制的国企改革提供有益借鉴.%This paper examines the governance effect of directors stationed by non-controlling shareholders on the turnover-performance sensitivity of state-owned enterprises executives. Empirical evidences show that directors accredited by non-controlling shareholders strengthen the association between the executives turnover and previously poor performance and that the higher ratio of directors stationed by non-controlling shareholders brings about the stronger association. In contrast, no evidence shows that their percentage of shares significantly improves the above association. The results indicate that the increase of directors stationed by non-controlling shareholders can be more effective than simply improving their percentage of shares, so it provides reference for the current reform of mixed ownership in SOE.
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