外资纵向兼并下竞争效果评估

摘要

By constructing simple Cournot competition model ,this article analyzes foreign vertical merger's effect on the price of upstream firms input and the final product and the total welfare in the absence of efficiency advantage . It is found that although the merged will implement market foreclosure under certain conditions ,price of the input and final product is still reduced .In addition , the increase of total welfare in the merger between domestic enterprises is always higher than that in the foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises .This article also proves that in the case of foreign vertical merger ,the aim of the competition policy is coordinated with that of the merger between domestic enterprises .%通过构建简单的上、下游市场古诺竞争模型，研究了在上游外资企业不存在效率优势时，外资纵向兼并我国企业对上游投入品价格、最终产品价格和社会福利的影响。研究发现：在一定条件下，兼并厂商会实施市场封锁，但兼并后中间投入品价格、最终产品价格都会下降。模型结果还显示：国内企业间纵向兼并的总福利增加总是高于外资企业并购国内企业的总福利增加，外资纵向并购时竞争效果评估与鼓励国内企业间兼并的产业政策目标是基本一致的。