基于Nash协商模型的回购契约机制

摘要

Considering retailer’s sale cost and the penalty cost of stockout,for random demand,this paper demonstrates the irrationality of the traditional buy-back contract,then establishes a new buy-back contract based on asymmetric Nash bargaining model with the participants’bargaining power in considera-tion.We demonstrate that this new contract can not only coordinate the supply chain,but also improve re-tailers’and suppliers’revenue.Some numerical experiments examining the results are obtained.%在考虑零售商销售边际成本以及供应链缺货惩罚成本的前提下，针对市场为一般随机需求的情况，本文首先论证了传统回购契约在协调供应链时的不合理性，然后在考虑供应链参与双方谈判能力的基础上，建立了基于不对称 Nash协商模型的回购契约机制，并证明了此机制在协调供应链的同时可以使得零售商和供应商的收益都得到改善，最后通过数值分析验证了所得到的理论成果。