首页> 中文期刊>南京审计学院学报 >自愿性内部控制审计有助于公司获得更多银行贷款吗?——基于银行产权性质的实证检验

自愿性内部控制审计有助于公司获得更多银行贷款吗?——基于银行产权性质的实证检验

     

摘要

Based on the analysis of property right character of the banking industry in China,this paper empirically tests the signal effect of the voluntary audit of internal control on the size of bank loan that the firms have borrowed from 2008 to 2011. The results show that,on the whole,the signals of voluntary internal control audit help the company get more bank loans,but the signaling is affected by the heterogeneity of the banking property rights. Namely,the companies that voluntarily issue the audit report of internal control cannot lend more from the state-owned banks,but can lend more from the private-owned banks. The evidence also shows that Big4 which represent the high-quality signals of the voluntary audit of internal control do not help the companies lend more from the state-owned banks or the private-owned banks. The results show that China's state-owned banks have insufficient demand for internal control audit,and both state-owned banks and private banks lack the demand for high-quality internal control audit.%在分析我国银行业产权性质的基础上,实证检验了2008—2011年自愿性内部控制审计信号对公司银行贷款规模的作用.研究结果发现:整体而言,自愿性内部控制审计信号有助于公司获得更多的银行贷款,但是信号作用受到银行业产权异质性的影响,表现为释放了自愿性内部控制审计信号的公司并不能获得更多的国有银行贷款,但能够获得更多的民营银行贷款;公司聘请四大进而释放高质量内部控制审计信号,并不能有助于公司进一步获得更多的国有或者民营银行贷款.研究结果还表明,我国国有银行对内部控制审计信号需求不足,并且国有银行和民营银行均对高质量的内部控制审计信号缺乏需求.

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