委托代理理论认为CEO变更是由于代理人没有实现委托人对企业价值的预期,委托人以解除契约的形式来体现其约束机制的威力.为验证委托代理理论对CEO变更与企业价值关系的解释力,基于委托代理理论的两个前提假设,即委托代理关系的成立和企业价值低于股东的预期,构建CEO变更与企业价值关系的Logistic回归模型.选取2005年至2009年中国资本市场发生CEO变更、A股持续经营的上市公司样本,依据样本企业价值和企业性质的不同对Logistic回归模型进行分组检验.研究结果表明,企业价值水平较高时,股东对企业价值的预期通常能够得到满足,导致股东依据企业价值水平变更CEO的可能性较小；民营企业由于公司治理水平较低,CEO与股东之间的委托代理关系不一定成立,这两种情况均会降低委托代理理论对CEO变更与企业价值关系的解释能力,因此仅用委托代理理论来解释CEO变更与企业价值关系具有一定的局限性.%Based on principal-agent theory, CEO turnover is considered as a power from principal of declaring the binding mecha- , nisra with the form of contract termination when the proxy doesn't achieve the enterprises value expected by principal. To verify the explanatory capacity of principal-agent theory for the relationship between CEO turnover and enterprise value, based on the presuppositions of principal-agent theory, namely the establishment of the principal-agent relation and the enterprise value less than shareholders expectation, logistic model of CEO turnover and enterprise value is established. Using the sample data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2009 which are divided into several groups based on CEO turnover. The study uses these datato test the logistic model in groups. The results show that; With higher levels of enterprise value, the expectations of shareholders to enterprise value are usually can be met, which leads to lower the probability of CEO turnover. Because of the low levels of corporate governance of private enterprises, the principal-agent relationship between CEO and shareholders is limited, the explanatory power of principal-agent theory to the relationship between CEO and enterprise value is reduced. Therefore, there are certain limitations of using principal-agent theory to explain the relationship between CEO turnover and enterprise value.
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