In recent years, with the rapid development of electronic commerce and internet finance, online supply chain finance is growing rapidly worldly.In China, banks and third-party B2B e-commerce platforms jointly providing short-term financing for the online traders has become the main pattern of online supply chain finance. Taking electronic order financing as an example, this paper investigates the design of incentive contract between the banks and the third-party B2B e-commerce platforms, and presents strategies of preventing two kinds of moral hazards, i.e.hidden action ( low-level effort in the process of reviewing credit awarding) and hidden information ( recommending low-credit borrowing enter-prises to the bank) of B2B platforms. Based on the principal-agent theory, we build two moral hazard models under“joint credit awarding mode” and“entrusted credit awarding mode” respectively and derive the optimal income distribution contracts between the banks and the B2B platforms. Through comparative study, we find that the optimal income distribution ratio obtained by the banks in“entrusted credit awarding mode” is no higher than the ratio obtained in “joint credit awarding mode”, and it is equal to the distribution ratio in “joint credit awarding mode” when the work efficiency& effectiveness of B2B platforms approach to infinity.It means that the banks can only obtain the lowest income distribution ratio under the“entrusted credit awarding mode”, which is the common mode in big data era and in the context of“data pledge-based” financing age.The results reveal the evolvement law of leadership between banks and B2B platforms under online supply chain finance, as well as the hidden reason why commercial banks in China are struggling to build their own B2B platforms. Under the“entrusted credit awarding mode” and based on the game theory, we adopt the game benefit matrixes between the banks and the B2B platforms to analyze the banks′incentive strategies to the B2B platforms given the different context.When the kickback from the hiding behavior is less than its cost, recommending high-credit enterprises is the dominant strategy for B2B platforms.Otherwise, the banks should stimulate the B2B platforms to recommend high-credit enterprises by means of strictly controlling the upper limit of income distribution ratio.In order to ensure their profits not to be affected by the hiding behavior of B2B platforms, the banks can also take measures to strengthen the guarantee towards the borrowing enterprises, such as signing buy-back contract with core supply chain enterprises and controlling the upper limit of the pledge rate.Finally, the relevant con-clusions of the paper are verified on the basis of a numerical simulation analysis.%在线供应链金融业务发展迅猛，银电合作已成主流模式。以电子订单融资为例，基于道德风险识别和防范的视角，采用委托代理理论和博弈论对银行与B2 B平台的激励契约进行研究。在联合授信和委托授信两种合作模式下，分别构建道德危害模型，推导并给出银行与B2 B平台二者的最优收益分配契约，以防范B2 B平台隐藏行动（授信审查过程中努力程度低）的道德风险。在委托授信下，构建银行与B2 B平台的博弈得益矩阵，分别给出不同情形下银行对B2 B平台的激励策略，以防范B2 B平台隐藏信息（向银行推荐低信用融资企业）的道德风险。研究结果表明，委托授信下银行的最优收益分配比例不超过联合授信下的最优收益分配比例，且与联合授信下B2 B平台的工作效率和工作有效性趋近于无穷大时的分配比例相等，是银行收益分配的最低水平，揭示了未来大数据时代和数据质押融资背景下，在线供应链金融业务中银行和B2 B平台二者主导权的演变规律以及当下中国商业银行纷纷自建B2 B平台的内在缘由。委托授信下，当隐瞒信息获得融资企业回扣小于隐瞒行为的成本时，选择推荐高信用融资企业且不隐瞒是B2 B平台的占优策略；反之，银行应通过严格控制收益分配比例上限的方式激励B2 B平台推荐高信用企业，或通过与供应链核心企业签订回购合约、严格控制质押率上限等方式，提高对融资企业的担保水平，以确保自身收益不受B2 B平台隐瞒行为的影响。最后，通过数值模拟对相关结论进行验证。
展开▼
