基于新媒体时代下信息传播模式的现状，从网络未确认信息在理性人群体与有限理性人群体中传播的特点入手。基于演化博弈理论，针对虚拟网络及其中的理性人与有限理性人对于消息的不同行为，建立在不同行为下的收益-风险矩阵。通过博弈进化计算，讨论了两方均转发得到的净收益、仅一方转发时各自的净收益对选择策略的影响。从而得到不同情形下网民群体之间的进化稳定策略。结果表明：由于有限理性转发者的参与，导致即使只有一方选择转发仍能够得到整体的最大收益；仅一方转发时，总收益受到两方是否合作的影响。最后根据演化结果对网络监管部门的控制提出相关意见。%Based on the current situation of information dissemination mode, this article starts with the disseminating characteristics of a ra-tional man and a bounded rationality man's attitude towards Internet unconfirmed information. Adopting the theory of evolution game, the article studies the different behaviors of different groups towards information and finds an evolution stabilization strategy among cyber citi-zen groups under different situations. According to the analysis of the impact on selection strategy, the result indicates that integral maxi-mum return can be gained from one party' s transmitting actions because of the participation of bounded rationality group;general earnings will be influenced by whether both groups will cooperate if there is just one party being engaging in the transmitting. At last, advices on network supervision are given according to evolution result to help the related government department to carry out their work of monitoring and control effectively.
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