An increasing number of manufacturers are adopting the dual sales channel structure: selling their products to customers via both online and physical channels. Although many companies, including HP, IBM, are using the dual channel to distribute products successfully, some of these manufacturers are facing problems. One major problem is about how a manufacturer can motivate its retailers to expand the market and coordinate these two channels. To motivate their retailers, an increased number of manufactures cooperate with retailers to make promotion. For instance, a manufacture shares promotion fees with its retailers or the manufacturer sends its employees to help retailer conduct promotional activities.The paper studies the pricing competing and channel coordination strategies in the dual channel supply chain where manufacturer and retailer face the stochastic demand and they need to cooperate to make promotion. The research result shows that the Nash equilibrium of price exists and the optimal price of the online channel will decrease the effort of a retailer. The promotional effort of a retailer will increase in the ratio of cost shared by its manufacturer. When the ratio is low, a retailer's effort will increase slowly in the ratio. When the ratio is high, a retailer's effort will increases rapidly in the ratio. Furthermore, this paper proves that the buy-back contract will benefit each other. However, the contract cannot coordinate the whole supply chain.%针对制造商同时拥有零售渠道和网上直销渠道的双渠道供应链系统,在随机需求和联合促销情况下,对制造商和零售商之间的价格竞争和协调问题进行研究.研究表明价格的纳什均衡解存在,网上渠道的最优价格随零售商促销努力程度的增大而降低.当制造商分担促销成本的比例上升时,零售商促销的努力程度会增加.当比例值较低时,零售商的努力程度变化不大；当比例值超过一定数值时,零售商的努力程度会显著增加.回购契约能给制造商和零售商双方带来好处,但不能实现双渠道供应链的协调.
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