与传统以“价值增加”为核心的边际分析不同,强调价值创造“结构”本身的特性.认为联盟结构的特征函数集合描述了价值创造的力量结构和联盟是否稳定的内在属性.研究表明,价值创造的特征函数结构同联盟核存在的最小价值创造的值之间存在线性变换关系,联盟的最大的k-重划分值等于联盟核存在的最小值.在联盟稳定性变化的临界状态下,其划分点作为了联盟结构的“合并”和“分解”点,不能出现在交集为空的互补性集合之间,各子联盟集合满足价值创造非互补性和线性可加性.%Value creation is a central concept and provides theoretical perspectives in the entrepreneurship and strategic management literature. Cooperative game theory ( CGT) provides a valuable alternative perspective to study fundamental value creation issues. In contrast to traditional CGT's marginal analysis on added value, this research focuses on the structure of value creation. Structures provide possible frameworks within which participants cooperate, and affect participants' behaviors. We suggest that characteristic functions describe power-distributed structures of value creation and intrinsic properties of coalition stability.We begin with some simple examples that introduce the theoretical setup and propositions. These examples demonstrate some of the subtleties in the way the total value created by coalitions influence their stability. These examples are particularly useful when the coalition is transformed into stable states, where points are connected, and when transformation reaches the edge states.In the section 2, we introduce basic definitions, the formalism of k - partition, and the partition point of cooperative game. We adopt this formalism to identify the maximum value, created by the linear transformation of sub-coalition, and minimum value, created by the coalition to satisfy the condition of core existence.In the section 3, we propose general coalition stability models to derive our results. Our propositions show that there exists a linear transformation between characteristic function structure of the value creation, the minimum value created by the coalition under the condition of core existence, and the maximum value of k - partition is equal to the minimum value. At the edge state of transformation of the coalition's stability, partition points, which are " merger" or " separateness" points of a coalition, do not appear between complementary sets. Where an empty intersection set meets each other, each sub-coalition satisfies no complementarity and linear additivity in value creation. In the section 4, we revisit questions discussed in the preceding examples. We give detail theoretical explanations about how different coalitions reach stable or unstable states, and where " merger" or " separateness" points of coalitionsare distributed.In summary, our results and findings shed lights on a new theoretical perspective for understanding coalition stability and its transformations. The research undoubtedly provides a new direction for researchers to explore organizational boundaries, evolutionary theories, and industry architectures with respect to value creation.
展开▼
