基于共享经济理论的委托代理机制研究——以杭州共享单车为例

摘要

Owing to the popularization of shared economy, the emergence of shared bikes has become a hot topic in the society.But in the initial stage of shared bikes operation, it is the stage of putting in funds to attract users, and its profit pattern is blurred.Therefore, combining the shared bikes and the principal-agent theory in the shared economy, this paper establishes a principal-agent model about shared bikes, taking Hangzhou shared bikes ofo and Mobike as an example of empirical research, and then the final result can be obtained.It is concluded that the benefit of shared bikes enterprises and the users is better under information asymmetry.At present, the profit of ofo is better than that of Mobike.The higher rate of theft is the main factor which hinders the profit of the enterprises.%把共享经济下的共享单车与委托代理理论相结合, 建立关于共享单车的委托代理模型, 并以杭州共享单车为例进行实证研究.结果得出, 信息不对称情况下共享单车企业与用户的效益更好, 目前杭州两大共享单车企业ofo的收益比Mobike更好, 同时较高的盗损率是阻碍企业盈利的主要因素.