农田保护补偿政策作为激励农户参与优质农田及乡村适宜景观地保护的有效方式和农业支持保护体系，在欧美发达国家及地区已有三十多年的实践经验，近年在国内成都、上海、苏州、广东及浙江等地也在积极实践及探索创新。国外相关研究关注农田保护补偿政策对参与主体(农场/农户)、实施区域所带来的异质效应及福利影响，重视政策实施及监管过程中因信息不对称而存在的交易成本约束及滋生的道德风险、逆向选择等激励非兼容问题；国内政策正处在创新实践阶段，少数研究初步探索补偿政策对参与农户激励成效及影响。文章建议未来加强探索政府主导与市场交易相融合的多元策略，界定农田保护补偿政策参与的有效主体及实施优先序，关注试点实践及政策运行产生的参与主体、涉及空间及成本异质性，以将典型试点地区的创新实践经验提升总结为制度层面建设。%Farmland’ s conservation compensation is the main policy instrument in the developed regions and countries, such as the European Union, the United States and so on. It is designed to encourage the farm-er households to protect the farmland, and to adopt some environmentally friendly farming methods to enhance (reduce) the supply of agricultural environmental public goods (bads). Such schemes offer fixed incentive payments, technology assistant or cost sharing for farmer households to participate in the agricultural activities. Farmland’ s conservation compensation is an effective and innovative policy instrument which encourage farm-ers to participate in the protection of high quality farmland and countryside landscape. In recent years, Chi-nese government has also proposed and guided the policies of farmland and prime land’ s conservation compen-sation. And the innovational practices of the farmland and prime land’ s financial or ecological compensation have taken place in Shanghai, Suzhou, Chengdu, Guangdong and some other regions. Farmland’ s conserva-tion compensation policy changes usually have differential spatial effects and individual disparity, because re-gions and farmer households are differentially endowed with productive factors and farmland resources, which are differentially mobile. So according to the real demand and international experience, this paper summarizes the progress and prospect on the implemental effect of farmland’ s conservation compensation policy based on its related researches which showed there exists the certain efficiency deflection and benefit diverge. Two themes should be focused on in the future. 1)It need to define the efficient regions, concession farmer house-holds and suitable compensation baseline into the implement of farmland conservation, and to reduce or avoid the incentive compatibility problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard and so on, which combined with information asymmetry about farmland potential and its heterogeneous;2 ) It will adjust and rectify the poli-cy deviation and improve the efficiency of farmland’ s financial compensation policy, and put forward the path dependency, relevant measures and control system to improve the policy, in order to summarize and make the local governments`abundant innovation practices into a universal, efficient and fairness compatible policy ar-rangement, so as to achieve the multiple goals of protecting the farmland’ s quality, quantity and landscape.
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