政府职务消费管制有效性研究--来自国有上市公司的经验证据

摘要

This paper arranges perks regulation policies from 1985 to 2012 in China,and then specifically analyses the contents of every regulation policy and gives corresponding scores to measure perks regulation degree.Based on the above,the author empirically tests the relationship between perks regulation and executive perks by using the samples of 2009—2012 state-owned enterprises(SOE)in Shanghai Stock Exchange.It is found that executive perks level decreases along with the strengthening of perks regulation degree.It shows that the perks regulation policy can inhibit executive perks in SOE.%通过梳理1985—2012年我国政府颁布的职务消费管制政策，并分析每项管制政策的侧重对象及内容条款，采用政策赋分法度量职务消费管制程度，在此基础上以2009—2012年沪市国有上市公司为样本，实证检验职务消费管制程度与国有企业管理层在职消费的关系。研究发现，管理层在职消费水平随着职务消费管制程度的增强而降低，表明政府颁布的职务消费管制政策能对国有企业管理层的在职消费产生抑制作用。建议政府部门进一步加大职务消费管制力度，以严控国有企业管理层在职消费行为。