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中国审计市场报告竞争行为实证研究

     

摘要

随着会计师事务所之间竞争日趋激烈,“报告竞争”这一新兴的竞争方式开始涌现。我国审计市场是否存在报告竞争,报告竞争行为会带来什么影响,应当如何予以限制,这些已成为亟待解决的问题。文章用委托代理理论、寻租理论等经济学理论以及博弈模型从报告竞争行为的角度分析我国审计市场是否存在基于非审计服务贿赂的“报告竞争”行为,并提出规范报告竞争行为的建议。%In recent years,with the increasingly fierce competition between certified public accounting firms, report competition has emerged as a new way of market competition. It is thus urgent to be clarified if there is a “report competition” in the audit market,what effect it will bring about and how we should regulate it. The study uses such economics theories as the principal-agent theory and rent-seeking theory combining with the game model to verify whether “report competition”are based on non-audit services bribery. It also puts forward suggestions about how to standardize the behaviors of report competition in the audit market of our country.

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