家族控制所衍生的双重委托代理冲突为公司治理研究提供了一个独一无二的视角。本文以2004~2008年1378家中国A股上市公司为样本,考察家族控制、双重委托代理冲突对于公司现金股利政策的影响。实证结果表明:(1)家族上市公司具有相对消极的现金股利政策,在控制其他影响因素后,家族上市公司的派现意愿和派现水平要比非家族上市公司低35%以上;(2)在我国两类代理冲突都会对上市公司现金股利政策产生显著负向影响;(3)家族上市公司具有相对消极现金股利政策的一个重要原因在于,家族控制加剧了第一类代理冲突而非第二类代理冲突并进而降低了上市公司的派现意愿和派现水平。%Using a sample of 1378 A-share listed companies for the period 2004 -2008, this paper empirically tests the impacts of family control and double principal-agent conflicts on the cash dividend policy of listed companies in China. The results show that, ( 1 ) the cash dividend payout propensity and ratio of family listed companies are 35% lower than that of non-family listed companies; (2.) double principal-agent conflicts of listed companies have significant negative impacts on the cash dividend payout propensity and ratio; (3) controlling family shareholders intensify the Agency Problem I (the owner-manager conflict) rather than the Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict), which leads to relative passive cash dividend policy.
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机译:中国双重上市公司a、h股价差影响因素的实证研究 =An Empirical Study on the Influence Factors of Price Difference between A-share and H-share of China's Dual-listed Companies