信贷管制、隐性契约与贷款利率变相市场化——现象与解释

摘要

本文将视角聚焦于利率市场化改革之前,重点研究金融抑制对银企信贷契约的异化.研究发现,在金融抑制背景下银企之间存在以留存贷款为表现的隐性契约,用以帮助银行在满足管制要求的同时追求利润最大化.本文对这一现象进行了理论分析与实证检验,发现隐性契约的发生与否会随着货币政策、企业特征等因素的改变而有所差异,这在一定程度上起到了利率变相市场化的作用.进一步研究则发现,这一隐性契约对企业价值产生了负向影响.%Along with the financial market reform,the financial repression has been greatly improved.On one hand,however,the reform is still in a gradual progress and the effects of regulation still exist; on the other hand,understanding of the effect of financial repression to corporate credit and loan is the basic of correctly evaluate the reform's outcome.Therefore,our study focus on the heterization of contract between banks and corporations affected by financial repression before the financial market reform.The results shows that under the background of financial repression,invisible contracts of retained loans exist between banks and corporations.Banks use retained loans to maximize their profit while fulfill regulations.This study theoretically and empirically analyses this phenomena and find out that the occurrence of invisible contract are affected by factors like monetary policy,corporate character etc.Such invisible contracts are acting as overt market interest rate.Further study suggest that this invisible contract negatively affected firm value.Our paper enriches the literary of macro policy and micro corporate behavior,connect with the studies of invisible contract,enhance the comprehension of bank and corporation relationship under financial repression and could provide policy suggestion to the reform of financial institutions.