管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系--基于动态内生性的经验研究

摘要

In this paper,716 listed companies range from 2002 to 2011 are used as our sample. In the framework of dynamic endogeneity,we use the dynamic System GMM model,based on a dynamic perspective to study the rela-tionship between managerial compensation incentives and corporate risk-taking. And we get the following results:There is dynamic endogeneity problem between managerial compensation and corporate risk-taking, not only current managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking, but also previous managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking,and two kinds of compensation incentives has a contrary effect on the corporate risk-taking. Besides,previous corporate risk-taking has a feedback effects on cur-rent managerial compensation.%本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本，在动态内生性的框架下，运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法，以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现：管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题，不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响，而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响，并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外，前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。