政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助*--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

摘要

This paper takes the money-losing listed companies from 2009 to 2012 in China as the research sample ,and uses the social network theory to analyze and test the influence of top-executives’ political connections on government subsidies obtained by mon‐ey-losing enterprises through charitable donations .The empirical results are shown as fol‐lows :firstly ,money-losing enterprises with political connections are more easily to imple‐ment charitable donations in virtue of the access to government support than those without political connections ,and the width of top-executives’ political connections has more posi‐tive impact on charitable donations in money-losing enterprises than the depth of top-exec‐utives’ political connections ;at the same time ,the local political connections of top execu‐tives with respect to the central political connections have more positive influence on chari‐table donations in money-losing enterprises ;secondly ,based on the“mutual benefit” prin‐ciple and in order to encourage enterprises to actively fulfill their social responsibilities ,the governments usually tend to give more financial subsidies to the enterprises with charitable donations ;thirdly ,compared to money-losing enterprises without political connections , money-losing enterprises with political connections can get more government assistance by charitable donations ,and compared to money-losing enterprises with central political con‐nections ,money-losing enterprises with local political connections can obtain more obvious“support” effects of government subsidies through charitable donations ;and money-losing enterprises which have the wider range of political connections can receive more govern‐ment grants through charitable donations .T he research findings deepen the understanding of charitable donation motivation and economic consequences in money-losing listed compa‐nies ,and provide a useful inspiration for the relevant departments to regulate corporate philanthropy .%文章以2009－2012年中国亏损上市公司作为研究样本，运用社会网络理论，分析和检验了高管的政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠行为获得政府补助的影响。研究结果表明：第一，有政治关联的亏损企业比无政治关联的亏损企业更容易出于获取政府支持而进行慈善捐赠，高管的政治关联广度相对于其政治关联深度对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更大，同时高管的地方政治关联相对于其中央政治关联对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响也更大；第二，基于“利益互惠”的原则以及对企业积极履行社会责任的鼓励，政府通常会倾向于对进行慈善捐赠的企业给予更多的补助；第三，相对于无政治关联的亏损企业，有政治关联的亏损企业的慈善捐赠能够帮助其获得更多的政府补助，相对于中央政治关联，地方政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠获得政府补助的“支持效应”更加明显，同时政治关联广度更宽的亏损企业也通过慈善捐赠获得了更多的政府补助。文章的研究结论深化了对中国亏损上市公司慈善捐赠的动机及其经济后果的认识，为相关部门规范企业慈善行为也提供了有益的启示。