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Political connection, corporate philanthropy and efficiency: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign

机译:政治联系,企业慈善和效率:来自中国反腐败运动的证据

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We find that the 2013 Chinese anti-corruption campaign remarkably reduced charitable donations from listed companies with strong political connections, and lessened government subsidies to these companies, implying a reciprocal relationship between companies and the government prior to the campaign. The campaign also improved the productivity of companies with strong connections. The results are consistent with a model in which favor exchanges between firms and the government divert resources away from production in a corrupt environment. These findings highlight a self-serving, and sometimes corrupt, motive of corporate donation, and imply that the campaign is effective in curbing corrupt collusion between companies and government officials. Moreover, they give empirical support to the negative efficiency implications of corruption.
机译:我们发现2013年中国反腐败活动显着降低了具有强大政治联系的上市公司的慈善捐款,并减少了对这些公司的政府补贴,暗示了公司与政府之间的互惠关系。该活动还提高了具有强大连接的公司的生产力。结果与一个模型一致,其中有利于公司与政府转移资源远离腐败环境中的生产。这些调查结果突出了一个自源,有时腐败,企业捐赠的动机,并暗示该活动有效地遏制公司与政府官员之间的腐败勾结。此外,他们对腐败的负效益造成了实证支持。

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